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Abstract: The formula for the “unconditional surrender” adopted in 
Casablanca on the 24th of January 1943 was meant to acquaint the governments of 
the states at war with the United Nations with the treatment and the terms of their 
countries would have to take, no matter when or why they might withdraw. 
 As far as Romania was concerned, the terms of surrender included, among 
others, demobilisation and disarmament, handing over war materials, amends etc, 
all of which were to be imposed on by the three great powers and had been thought 
mainly to secure safety and to carrying on the warfare against Germany. These 
objectives were considered to have deep political implications.  
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The Truce Convention concluded by Romania, on the one hand, and the 
United Nations, on the other hand, was not the document that the Romanian 
opposition and the authorities had been waiting for during the secret negotiation in 
Cairo, Ankara or Stockholm. The formula for “unconditional surrender” adopted in 
Casablanca on the 24th of January 1943 was meant to acquaint the governments of 
the states at war with the United Nations with the treatment and the terms their 
countries would have to take, no matter when or why they might withdraw. 
 As far as Romania was concerned, the terms of surrender included, among 
others, demobilisation and disarmament, handing over war materials, amends etc, all 
of which were to be imposed by the three great powers and had been thought of 
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mainly to secure safety and a carrying on of warfare against Germany. These 
objectives were considered to have deep political implications1. 
 In the first few days right after the blow at the palace on the 23rd of August 
and after changing sides and turning against Germany, Romania’s international 
political standpoint was that of an independent state waging war against its former 
allies and siding with its former enemies, part of its territory being seized from a 
military point of view. On entering Bucharest, the Soviet army was to find here an 
independent government which was both able and willing to conclude the truce and 
could easily take pride in having drawn upon its own resources to neutralise German 
troops and to set free a significant part of the national territory2. If the Soviets had, 
by any chance, made different plans3 for Romania4, they were to be overthrown by 
king Mihai who had managed to change the course of history by having the marshal 
arrested. What the new Romanian authorities intended to do was to sign an 
agreement with the United Nations as soon as possible in order to prevent the Red 
army from taking military control of the whole country. 
 The assignment of the new government was all the more pressing as the 
Soviet armies, particularly their leading bodies, used to regard the country as if the 
territory had been occupied through fighting. Initially, the Soviets also wanted the 
truce to be concluded as soon as possible, for they were aware of the strategic 
advantage represented by the direct threat on Hungary in what was to be known as 
the most important movement of front translation in the history of World War II. 
Subsequently, the situation would change: Russian troops having already occupied 
the whole Romanian territory and the Soviet government becoming aware of the 
                                                          
1
 August 23rd 1944. Documents, vol 1, Bucureşti, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, pp. 66-
70. 
2
 Official news released by the Soviet army mentioned fighting to set whole regions free, 
including the capital city, thus taking credit for something which had already been 
accomplished by the Romanian troops. It is also true that after Anglo-American allies had set 
Paris free, the Russians tried to impress by the liberation of Bucharest.  
3
 The scenario of taking control of Central and South-Eastern European countries was, to a 
great extent, similar in all countries that had been set free by the Red army. They would have 
to accept the coming to power of communist parties supported by the Soviet  
Union. Further reference, Sperlea, Florin, Aparatul politic în armatele ţărilor Europei 
Centrale şi de Sud-Est (1944-1947), R.I.M no 1/41-1997, p. 47. 
4
 Establishing groups of volunteers, the constant involvement of the Moscow representatives 
of the Communist Party in Romania and the existence of the volunteer division “Tudor 
Vladimirescu” were enough to suggest what the true intentions of the Soviets were. The 
Soviet Union was taken aback by this move; they would now have to take the longer path 
and rely on the terms of the Truce Convention to make Romania a Communist country. 
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advantages that military control over Romania, the Soviets would no longer rush 
towards concluding the truce. 
 At the basis of the truce were actually the terms offered to Romania in April 
and reiterated on the 25th of August in the statement made by Molotov, the 
commissary in charge with foreign affairs on behalf of the Soviet Union. These 
terms were to be discussed in Moscow, where the Soviets would have a great say 
during negotiation with the Romanian representatives1. 
 Shortly after the 23rd of August, the representatives of the United States, 
Great Britain and the Soviet Union would make haste in the matter of concluding 
and signing the truce based on the text that had already been approved of in April 
19442. The negotiation asked for further explanatory notes and annotations in the 
draft Truce Convention3, that is why the final text was not concluded and made 
known to the Romanian party until the 10th of September 1944. 
 The Romanian authorities would go to great lengths to conclude the Truce; 
to this purpose, they sent to Moscow a group made of Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, Ghiţă 
Pop, Dumitru Dămăceanu, Ion Christu, who were all specialists in economic matters 
and international law. Unfortunately, the talks carried out in Moscow by 
representatives of the Romanian government and representatives of the Allies did 
not touch upon negotiating the suggested terms, despite the fact that the Romanian 
party did object to several aspects; most of their objections were overlooked by the 
Soviet Premier V. Molotov who was the chief negotiator of the Allies. 
 Despite the Soviet refusal to grant any favours, the Anglo-Americans would 
come to the conclusion that the Romanians headed back home feeling that they had 
got off cheap; what they found to be of greater importance was the way in which the 
Soviets would interpret and bring into operation the truce terms. The application 
practice to the Truce Convention signed on the 12th of September 1944 would only 
prove that the concern voiced by the Romanian group was only rightful; up to that 
                                                          
1
 Ibidem. The negotiation in which the British, the Russians and the Americans participated 
took longer than expected, as the allies had difficulty agreeing upon certain provisions of the 
Truce Convention 
2
 Mihai, Bărbulescu, Dennis, Deletant, Keith, Hitchins, Serban, Papacostea, Pompiliu, 
Teodor, Istoria României (The History of Romania), Bucureşti, Editura Enciclopedică, 1999, 
p. 469 
3
 Dennis Deletant, op. cit., p. 40. The British had in mind establishing and Allied 
Commission for Control, much like the one that had already been established in Italy, 
whereas the Soviets’ proposals were either frail (fight against Germany) or, in a somewhat 
obscure way, less favourable to the Romanian government (the taking over of the country by 
the Soviet army). Thus, the idea of an autonomous area where Soviet armies would not have 
access was overlooked.  
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moment, the Romanian group had been closely and specifically informed by the 
government in Bucharest about the behaviour of Soviet troops and their treatment of 
the civil and military authorities and of the civilians. Aware of the importance of 
Romania’s taking part in the war, the Romanian authorities would do their best to 
lay as soon as possible the foundations of a future co-operation with the 
commanding structures of the Red Army. To this end, the Romanian Department of 
Military Structures would even draw up a document called Detailed Norms to 
ensure collaboration with the Soviet army1. 
 Unfortunately, with the signing of the Truce Convention on the 12th of 
September 1944, the subordination of the operative structures in the Romanian army 
became official; the first article read: all enterprise against Germany and Hungary 
undertaken by the Romanian army, naval and air forces here included, will be 
supervised by the Allied (Soviet) High Command2. It was the Allied (Soviet) Control 
Commission, subject to the same Allied High Command, that had to supervise how 
the Truce provisions were brought into operation3. 
 During truce negotiations, the government led by Stătescu took a firm stand 
on the issue of war prisoners and deported persons; before leaving for Moscow, the 
members of the Romanian delegation were thoroughly instructed to take all 
necessary steps towards their release. 
 On the 28th of August, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Grigore Niculescu-
Buzeşti let the Romanian Legation in Ankara know that the Romanian government 
was pleased to receive the official acknowledgement of the statement made by 
Molotov on the 25th of August, but its observance was conditioned by the following: 
Romanian troops should no longer be disarmed, whereas the troops that had 
already been disarmed should be armed again and placed at the disposal of the 
Romanian government to take action against Germany4. The directives of the 
Romanian minister also had in view the Romanian fleet in Constanta. But on the 1st 
of September the problem was still unsolved, at which point the Romanian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs sent a telegram to the same Legation in Ankara and let them 
                                                          
1
 Archives of the Defence Department, fund 948, file 856, p. 124  
2
 The complete text of the Truce Convention in România, marele sacrificat…, op. cit. pp. 
311-314. 
3
 In fact, by resorting to the text of the convention and by enjoying almost complete control 
of the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission, the Soviets would try to get total control over the 
internal political situation, claiming that they wanted to secure peace and order beyond the 
front. They were practically free to take any course of action they wanted, as long as they 
could loosely interpret and bring into operation the Truce provisions. 
4
 Archives of the Defence Department, fund 71/1920-1944, Turkey, Telegrams, Ankara, pp. 
134-135 
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know about the occupation regime set up by the Red Army and the fact that there 
had been delays in establishing direct contact with the Soviet commanding 
structures1. 
 As for the condition of the Romanian troops, it was mentioned the fact that 
the disarming process was not as extensive as before, but it was still going on, 
pointing out that the measures taken by the Red Army could only damage the 
country’s sovereignty and independence2. The topic would occur over and over 
again in the newspapers the authorities in Bucharest would send to the Romanian 
delegation. As they kept presenting how difficult was for them to efficiently 
communicate with the commanding structures of the Soviet armies which had set up 
an occupational regime, the Romanian government would also try to bring to 
attention again their desire that every effort should be made in order to respect the 
Soviet statement made on the 25th of August. They insisted upon the important part 
played by the Romanian army on the 23rd of August, thus asking for another major 
problem to be solved: the release of the Romanian military who had been captured 
on the front in Moldova after the 23rd of August and who were now essential and 
could be sent to fight back German and Hungarian troops that were preparing 
offensive attack. Nobody doubted the Red Army’s operational skills, but the return 
of the Romanian military was likely to further stimulate and raise the spirits of 
Romanian soldiers and officers; thus, Romania could take a more active and 
efficient part in the cause of the United Nations. As for the disarmament of 
Romanian troops, mention was made of the fact that an agreement had been reached 
with General Tolbukin, who declared that disarmament would never be heard of 
again. Unfortunately, Romanian authorities had been informed that the disarming 
process had not come to an end; it was still going on, especially in some areas in 
Muntenia. Therefore, the Romanian government was confident that all these 
problems would be dealt with upon the signing of the Truce documents 3– an event 
which kept being postponed. 
 The commanding structures of the Romanian army, that is the Romanian 
Department of Military Structures and its head, General Gheorghe Mihail were to 
pay special attention to this problem and to take the course of action that the 
Romanian party had hoped for, shortly after the 23rd of August. Their will was 
voiced by their representative in the Romanian delegation, General Dumitru 
                                                          
1
 Ibidem, vol. VIII, p. 186 
2
 Ibidem. Obviously, the specification was nothing more but a reiteration of what had been 
stated in the telegram sent on the 28th  of August: the problems and the solutions envisaged 
were much the same. 
3
 Ibidem, p. 241 
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Dămăceanu, who brought up the difficult situation of the Romanian troops that had 
been prevented from leaving the concentration camps in Moldova1. At some point 
previous to the signing of the truce convention2, in an attempt to synthesise the steps 
taken towards the Soviet military authorities, the Department of Military Structures 
would let all Romanian military know that all efforts had been made towards the 
release of the officers and of the troop that had been disarmed and were arbitrarily 
held hostages by the Soviets3. 
The arrival of the Romanian delegation at Moscow did not automatically 
mean concluding the truce, the content of which was only presented as final text on 
the 10th of September 1944. The delay can hardly be accounted for and it resulted in 
the Convention being signed on the 12th of September. During Truce negotiations, 
the Romanian party brought up again the problem of Romanian war prisoners taken 
by the Red Army on the front in Moldova. On behalf of the government in 
Bucharest, the delegation requested that the disarming by the Red Army cease and 
they justified their request by stating that on the 24th of August, at 4 a.m., the 
Romanian Department of Military Structures had put an end to warfare against the 
Soviet army, and the official state of war had been made public by the Romanian 
government on the 25th of August4. 
 Despite the fact that the Truce had not yet been signed, Romanian 
representatives felt that Romanian troops were entitled to their armament, as they 
were actively taking part in fighting against Germany. The common cause could not 
be supported by disarming and confining Romanian soldiers and officers, 
consequently, it was essential that Romanian armies that had been disarmed to be 
armed again as soon as possible to enable them to take action against Germany5. 
The Romanian party also took into account the officers and crew in the Danube 
Delta and on the Black Sea which were forced to surrender by an ultimatum 
delivered by the commanding structures of the Soviet fleet6. 
 By supporting with arguments the proposals made by the Romanian party, 
the Romanian military representative, General Dumitru Dămăceanu, would insist 
                                                          
1
 Archives of the Defence Department, fund M. St. M., section 3, file 2876, p 23. Dumitru 
Dămăceanu, who had just been promoted to the rank of general, had been instructed ever 
since the 27th of August to ask for the Romanian troops to be sent to an unoccupied area. 
2
 Ibidem, fund 948, file 1478, p. 244. 
3
 Ibidem, pp. 205-206. 
4
 This would have tremendous impact on the German troops, as General H. Friessner stated 
that German troops were in utter chaos. 
5
 Apud Oşca, Al., Chiriţoiu, Mircea, Armistiţiu sau Dictat (Truce or Dictate) in R.I.M, no 
2/1995, p. 12. 
6
 Ibidem  
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upon the precarious strategic condition of the Romanian army which, at the time, 
only had at its disposal one armed division, since the others were meant for inland 
and the ones that had been withdrawn from Moldova had been deprived of military 
equipment by the Soviet Union1. Mention was also made of the body of troops 5, 6 
and 7 which had been disarmed by the Soviets after the 23rd of August and it was 
suggested that the armament be handed back in order to provide the necessary 
equipment to the 12 Romanian divisions that were to leave for the West front, in 
keeping with the terms of the Truce Convention. 
 In the matter of the Romanian prisoners who had been in the Soviet Union 
from the beginning of the war to the moment when hostilities between the Romanian 
and the Russian armies ceased, the members of the Romanian delegation had 
definite, clear suggestions to make. Although they admitted that the proposal was 
not intended as a commitment for the Soviet government to hand them back their 
arms, the Romanian delegation emphasised that if this happened, it could only 
benefit the fight against Germany and it would help the Romanian party bring into 
more efficient operation the provisions of the Truce Convention2. By declining, the 
Soviet party would thus state that the problem is within the scope of military 
technicians, of little present interest, despite the urge voiced by the Romanian 
representatives.  
 By going over V. M. Molotov’s conversational notes on receiving the 
Romanian delegation on the occasion of the truce being concluded, one thing 
becomes transparent: the Soviet party was well aware of the fact that Romanian 
military were prepared to start solving military problems. This argument was 
rejected by the Soviet representative, who argued that the war had been going on for 
three years, and now they only needed a few weeks to move on and embrace the new 
conditions3. The Soviet high official also stated that, for military reasons, the 
proposals made by the Romanian delegation would only be analysed and dealt with 
in accordance with the extent to which the Romanian government would become 
                                                          
1
 Further reference The Shorthand Report of the sessions to conclude the truce between the 
Allied Powers and Romania, in România, marele sacrificat,  pp. 297-309  
2
 The issue of repatriating or of releasing the Romanian military captured by the Soviets 
either before or after the 23rd of August was not to be taken up, in terms of international law, 
before the Peace Conference in Paris in February 1947, whereas Romania was bound by 
convention to set free all the allied prisoners captured by the Romanian army. The Soviet 
Union would show no benevolence until after the 6th of March 1945, when the government 
led by Petru Groza and controlled by the Communists came to power. 
3
 Misiunile lui A. I. Vâşinski, Institutul Naţional Pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, Bucureşti, 
1997, p. 66. 
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involved in the war against Germany1. Obviously, during negotiation, that kind of 
statement on behalf of the Soviet party could only provide them with more 
opportunities to blackmail the Romanian party by consistently delaying a resolution 
in keeping with the terms of the truce that was to be concluded, that is sine die. 
 The return home of the Romanian delegation, after the Truce had been 
concluded, would bring about controversy, both within the Council of Ministers and 
within political parties. Whereas the Communist Party showed gratitude for the 
“generous” offers made to Romania, the leaders of historical parties were extremely 
sceptical about how the provisions of the Truce Convention would be applied and 
interpreted by the Soviets2.  
 During the encounters between the representatives of the Romanian 
delegation with members of the government, General Dumitru Dămăceanu was to 
confirm that he had taken particular interest in the matter of Romanian war 
prisoners. His proposals envisaged grouping them into two: on the one hand, the 
prisoners taken between the 22nd of June 1941 and the 24th of August 1944, on the 
other hand, the prisoners were taken after the 24th of August, 4 a.m. The demands 
made by the Romanian military man included releasing in the shortest time possible 
the Romanian prisoners taken before the 23rd of August and then handing back all 
Romanian units and formations alongside with their equipment and ammunition 
dumps, including the war ships on the Danube and the Black Sea, that had been 
captured and disarmed after the 24th of August, 4 a.m.3 The answers the Romanian 
military man received from the homologous parts as representatives of the Allies 
suggested, once again, that the problem was to be solved in accordance with the 
military co-operation and assistance Romania would offer against German and 
Hungarian forces4. Consequently, the Truce Convention would stipulate nothing 
about the condition of Romanian war prisoners who were kept in camps by the 
Soviet Union; mention was only made of releasing the allied prisoners taken by the 
Romanian army. The only part the Convention played was that of wearing away the 
effects of the coup d’Etat on the 23rd of August 1944 which posed serious threats to 
Kremlin’s intentions about Romania’s post-war status. 
                                                          
1
 Ibidem. At the time, the Romanian government had already become entirely involved in the 
fight against German troops which had not left the country, paving the way for the Red 
Army, whereas the latter was disarming and preventing Romanian soldiers from leaving the 
camps along the frontline, despite their having ceased hostilities. 
2
 Further reference, the shorthand reports of the Council of Ministers on the 1st and on the 
16th of September 1944, on concluding the Truce Convention. 
3
 Futher reference R.I.M., Al. Duţu, op. cit. p. 47 
4
 Ibidem  
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 The controversy between Romanian representatives and Soviet 
representatives within the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission would only 
emphasise that neither party trusted that it was possible to solve the problems raised 
by the interpretation and the application of the text of the Truce Convention. 
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